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Abstract
We study optimal contracts when employees are averse to inequity as modelled by Fehr
and Schmidt (1999). A ”selﬁsh” employer can proﬁtably exploit preferences for equity
among his employees by oﬀering contracts which create maximum inequity oﬀ-equilibrium
and thus, leave employees feeling envy or guilt when they do not produce the optimal
output level. We show how the optimal contract is designed such that the subgame played
by the employees is dominance solvable, and thus, a unique optimal level of production
is implemented. We also discuss conditions for inequity aversion to aﬀect the optimal
output choice. Similar results are obtained for other types of distributional preferences
such status-seeking or eﬃciency concerns.
First draft: June, 2002
This version: July 7, 2004
JEL codes: D23; D63; M52; M54
Keywords: Principal, agent, inequity aversion, team incentives, behavioral contract theory
∗I am indebted to Tilman Börgers and Steﬀen Huck for multiple discussions and to Dirk Engelmann for extensive
comments. I am also grateful to Ken Binmore, Martin Bøg and Cloda Jenkins for help and support and to Jordi
Brantds, Antonio Cabrales, Antoni Calvó, Armin Falk, Matthew Rabin, Klaus Schmidt and Joel Sobel for comments.
Ib e n e ﬁted from discussion with seminar participants at Budapest, Bristol, UCL, the SMYE in Leuven (2003), the
European Science Days in Steyr (2003) and the EEA-ESEM Joint Meeting in Stockholm (2003). Financial support
from Fundación Ramón Areces is gratefully acknowledged.
†Pedro Rey Biel. Department of Economics. University College London (UCL), Gower Street, WC1E 6AB, London.
Tel: 00 44 (0)207 679 5842. E-mail: p.biel@ucl.ac.uk.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper, we study how managers should structure reward schemes when their employees care
for the distribution of payoﬀs among their co-workers. We discuss how contracts can exploit this
externality in preferences to the manager’s advantage.
One of the most striking results from interview studies with ﬁrm managers (Agell and Lundborg
(1999), Bewley (1999), Blinder and Choi (1990), Campbell and Kamlani (1997)) is that employees
report to care for the well being of co-workers and not only for their own. In particular, they compare
co-workers’ salaries and performance in the ﬁrm with their own. Bewley (1999) shows that 69% of real
ﬁrm’s managers interviewed oﬀer formal pay structures because it creates internal equity. Asked why
internal equity is relevant, 78% of managers answered that it was important for morale and internal
harmony and 49% responded that internal equity was key for job performance. Our paper aims to
capture these stylized facts in a very simple model. We show that when agents are distributionally
concerned it is optimal to oﬀer contracts which create more equity when managers’ demands are met
than when they are not. The reason is that equity aﬀects the employees’ incentives to work hard and
thus, it aﬀects job performance. Following Holmstrom and Milgrom’s (1991) seminal paper, optimal
contracts must account for everything employees care about. Here we explore how the optimal contract
changes when agents care for equity as modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999).1
In prominent experimental work, F&S (2000) have argued that fairness considerations lead agents
to write incomplete contracts which implement less severe incentives than conventional theory would
predict. We develop a simple model in which a principal has to design a reward scheme for two agents
who dislike inequity in the way envisaged by F&S. However, contrary to F&S, our principal is not
distributional concerned and agents do not care for the principal’s welfare, but only for the other
agents’ and their own. Our main result is that a ”selﬁsh” principal can devise schemes which exploit
agents’ preference for equity by oﬀering them equitable outcomes in situations where they put in the
desired eﬀort, and threaten with highly unequal outcomes if agents shirk. Such schemes might, for
example, oﬀer extremely unequal rewards in the case that one employee works harder than another.
By constructing such schemes, the principal can elicit the desired eﬀort levels oﬀering lower rewards
than would have been possible had the agents not been inequity averse. When agents are inequity
averse the principal has two instruments at his disposal: rewards and equity. By oﬀering more equity
when employees perform the eﬀort level desired by the manager than when they do not, the manager
does not need to create as much incentives for employees to meet his demands and thus, he can pay
lower rewards. To minimize equilibrium rewards paid, the principal oﬀers rewards such as inequity is
maximized oﬀ-equilibrium. Finally, because it may be cheaper to provide incentives for agents to work
the optimal level of production might change. Moreover, in our simple setting with no informational
problems, the principal never loses by accounting for inequity aversion in the design of the contracts,
even when faced with standard agents.
Our research is parallel to F&S (2000) in that, even if we are dealing with inequity aversion in a
1We use F&S in the following to refer to these authors.
2Principal-Agent setting, both the principal and the agents have diﬀerent preferences than in the F&S
papers. That is, in F&S the comparison of utilities among individuals is vertical (employers compare
their welfare to their employees’ and vice-versa) while in this paper it is horizontal (employees compare
their welfare only among themselves and the Principal only cares for his own payoﬀs).
Horizontal comparisons among agents seem intuitive. It is natural to assume that welfare compar-
isons are enhanced by repeated interaction and that employees at the same hierarchical level interact
more frequently among themselves than with their superiors. Additionally, it could be argued that
employees performing the same task have better information about each agent’s cost of eﬀort and ﬁnd
it easier to learn about co-workers’ rewards than those of their superiors. Finally, sociologists have
argued that individuals rarely have altruistic feelings for others that have direct authority over their
actions.2 Thus, utility comparisons seem more meaningful among employees on the same hierarchical
level than on diﬀerent levels.3 This motivates our research.
We have chosen the F&S utility function as a reduced form of social preferences due to its promi-
nence and because with simple parameter transformations we can obtain similar results for other types
of distributional preferences which might be relevant in the workplace.4 We later discuss distribu-
tional preferences like Status and Eﬃciency Seeking. Notice that we do not discuss more complicated
forms of social preferences which include reciprocal behavior and intentions.5 These preferences could
play a role in optimal contract design if we studied repeated interactions in the context of the ﬁrm.
However, with reciprocal preferences it would be crucial to study the reaction by agents to threats of
inequity by the principal. But this reaction would imply that employees care for the intentions of the
employer, meaning that vertical considerations would play a role from which we want to abstract.
Our model is very stylized. First, we focus on incentive compatibility, not on participation. We
assume that the participation constraint does not bind and thus both agents work for the ﬁrm. We
normalize the utility of being in the ﬁrm to zero and we assume that the utility derived from not
being in the ﬁrm is below this value. As we do not explicitly model an outside option its utility could
take any value. We simply assume it is lower than inside the ﬁrm. This could be justiﬁed for diﬀerent
reasons: search costs of ﬁnding a diﬀerent job, good matching with employers, speciﬁc human capital,
disutility of unemployment or the existence of minimum rewards. But in particular, notice that if
agents are still inequity averse when taking the outside option, utility when leaving the ﬁrm could be
lower than inside the ﬁrm. As the reference group in the outside option is unclear and it is probably
context dependent, we simplify the analysis of the participation constraints by assuming they do not
bind. Our results are thus limited to this case. Another possible interpretation of our model is that
the rewards in the model are not agents’ wages but a bonus oﬀered to perform an extra activity. Thus,
2See Homans (1950) for a summary.
3For example, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2000) express doubts on which variables would be used to compare
employees and employer’s utilities. In particular, they ask how meaningful is to compare employees’ salaries with ﬁrm’s
proﬁts or the value of the ﬁrm’s shares.
4In particular, our main result would hold for the models proposed by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Bazerman,
Loewenstein and Thompson (1989), Andreoni and Miller (1998), Cox and Firedman (2002), and the simpliﬁcation
without intentions by Charness and Rabin (2002).
5For good surveys on social preferences see Sobel (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (2002b).
3while the wage would take care of the participation constraint, the extra bonus provides incentives
to perform an extra eﬀort. In that view, our results should be interpreted as saying that bonuses
might not need to cover employees’ cost of doing that extra eﬀort when they feel envy or guilt towards
their peers. This interpretation is close to empirical eﬀects observed under real team and relative
performance contracts (Bandiera et al. (2004)).
Second, we do not consider an uncertain production environment. In our model output is de-
terministic and perfectly informative about the eﬀort level performed by each agent. We want to
show how inequity aversion in itself changes the optimal contract, without adding uncertainty. In a
paper independently written at the same time as this one, Itoh (2004) uses a model where output is
uncertain and shows that inequity aversion calls for optimal contracts to specify both agents’ rewards
under all possible circumstances, which is very similar to our claim. However, Itoh’s mechanism is
diﬀerent from ours. In his model, each agent undertakes a diﬀerent project and the principal writes
the contract such that both agents always perform high eﬀort. More equal (or more unequal) rewards
are used in Itoh’s paper to compensate for the risk of one of the agents’ projects failing. In our paper,
inequity aversion determines whether it is optimal or not to form teams in which both agents perform
high eﬀort and we show how unequal rewards must be oﬀered oﬀ-equilibrium to optimally exploit
inequity aversion. Both approaches are complementary.
Other papers have simultaneously studied optimal contracts with both vertical and horizontal
welfare comparisons. Englmaier and Wambach (2002) study the interaction between an inequity
averse agent who compares himself with a selﬁsh principal. Grund and Sliwka (2002) study the
horizontal comparison in a tournament context. Cabrales and Calvó-Armengol (2002) use inequity
aversion only among employees to justify skill segregation. Huck and Rey Biel (2002) look at teams
formed by inequity averse agents when there is no principal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 shows the
optimal contract when agents have standard preferences. Section 4 shows the optimal contract when
agents are inequity averse. Section 5 discusses optimal contracts when distributional preferences take
other forms, such status seeking and eﬃciency concerns. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains
the proofs while Appendix B shows two relevant examples.
2 The Model
There are a Principal and two agents i,j = {1,2} with i 6= j. Agents can either work or not work. If
both agents work, production is normalized to 1 (joint production). If only agent i works, production
is qi, where 0 <q i < 1 (individual production by agent i). If no agent works, production is 0. Output
is observable. Eﬀort is veriﬁable and contractible.
The cost for each agent of working is ci > 0. The cost of not working is normalized to 0.A
complete contract speciﬁes the rewards oﬀered to both agents for all possible output levels. In order to
standardize notation, assume the principal oﬀers rewards {w1,w 2}t oa g e n t s1 and 2 respectively when
both agents work, {w1
1,w1
2} when agent 1 individually works and {w2
1,w2
2} when agent 2 individually
4works. If no agent works, rewards are zero.6
The structure of the game is as follows: the Principal oﬀers rewards for all possible production
levels, agents decide simultaneously whether or not to work and, once production is realized, promised
rewards for the output level produced are paid. Following Mookherjee (1984) and Moore and Repullo
(1988), we look at the contract such that the implemented production level is the unique equilibrium
in pure strategies of the subgame played by the agents.
The Principal seeks to maximize its proﬁt, that is, production minus rewards paid. Given the
minimum rewards needed to be paid in equilibrium to implement each production level and the
productivity parameters (qi and ci), the Principal designs the contract that maximizes its proﬁt. Two
diﬀerent speciﬁcations for the agents’ utility functions will be considered in Sections 3 and 4. These
speciﬁcations will be explained later.
The structure of the game is common knowledge and, in particular, both the Principal and the
agents know the rewards oﬀered, the production level each agent achieves if working individually and
each agents’ cost of eﬀort. Agents cannot communicate among themselves.
Assume the following.
(C) T h es u mo fw o r k i n ga g e n t s ’c o s t so fe ﬀort is smaller than the output produced.
0 ≤ c1 <q 1,
0 ≤ c2 <q 2,
c1 + c2 < 1.







(R2) Rewards are paid from output produced.







Assumption (C) implies that there always exists a surplus above the cost of eﬀort performed.
Assumption (R1) is a limited liability constraint ruling out that the Principal can monetarily punish
agents for not performing eﬀort.7 Assumption (R2) is a budget constraint for the Principal. Notice
that for contracts to be credible, assumption (R2) must also hold for rewards oﬀered oﬀ the equilibrium
of the subgame.8
6This is implied by assumptions (R1) and (R2) below.
7As we see below, the key is that even if the Principal is restricted in the monetary punishments he can use, he has
another instrument, inequity, to punish agents when his demands are not met.
8As it will be clear below, we impose budget constraints oﬀ-equilibrium to show the interesting interplay between
53 Optimal contract with standard agents
In this section we derive the optimal contract when agents are standard. Standard agents maximize
their ”direct utility” which is equal to the reward oﬀered minus the cost of eﬀort performed. Below
we show each agents’ direct utility in the subgame depending on the action taken and the rewards
oﬀered by the Principal.
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We ﬁrst solve for the optimal contract necessary to implement each production level and then,
given the optimal rewards, we derive conditions for each production level to be optimal. Although the
solution of this problem is straightforward, we solve it here as reference for the following subsection.
3.1 Optimal contract to implement individual production with standard
agents
We here ﬁnd the optimal contract to implement individual production by agent 1 as the unique
equilibrium of the subgame played by the agents.9 The problem is the following:
-The Principal maximizes its proﬁt:
Max q1 − w1
1
subject to:
-Assumptions (C), (R1) and (R2).
-A g e n t1 prefers to work than not to work when agent 2 works: w1
1 − c1 ≥ 0,
-A g e n t2 prefers not to work than work when agent 1 works: w1
2 >w 2 − c2.
For the subgame to be dominance solvable, the following constraints are also necessary:
-A g e n t1 prefers to work than not to work when agent 2 works: w1 − c1 >w 2
1,
-A g e n t2 prefers to work than not to work when agent 1 does not work: w2
2 − c2 > 0.
creating inequity oﬀ-equilibrium via envy or guilt. Without budget constraints, the Principal would always oﬀer inﬁnite
rewards to one agent oﬀ-equilibrium, maximizing the other agent’s envy when not performing the optimal production
level.
9The optimal contract to implement individual production by agent 2 is symmetric.
6The objective function and the restrictions are linear. Thus, the solution is straightforward:
w1
1 = c1 w1
2 =0 ,
w1 ∈ (c1,1 − w2] w2 ∈ [0,c 2),
w2
1 ∈ [0,w 1) w2
2 ∈ (c2,q 2 − w2
1].
The optimal contract is such that in equilibrium, the agent who individually works is exactly
compensated for his cost of eﬀort (w1
1 = c1) while the agent who does not work is paid no reward
(w1
2 =0 ). The Principal’s proﬁt in the unique equilibrium of the subgame is then equal to q1 − c1.
Oﬀ-equilibrium rewards do not aﬀect the Principal’s proﬁts and thus, they can take any value in the
intervals shown.
3.2 Optimal contract to implement joint production with standard agents
We here ﬁnd the optimal contract to implement joint production as the unique equilibrium of the
subgame played by the agents. The problem is the following:
-The Principal maximizes its proﬁt:
Max 1 − w1 − w2
subject to:
-Assumptions (C), (R1) and (R2).
-A g e n ti prefers to work than not to work when agent j works: wi − ci ≥ w
j
i.
For the subgame to be dominance solvable, the following constraints are also necessary:
-A g e n ti prefers to work than not to work when agent j does not work while
agent j prefers not to work when agent i does not work:
For wi − ci >w
j
i and wj − cj ≥ wi
j then wi
i − ci < 0 and w
j
j − cj > 0.
Again, the objective function and the restrictions are linear so the solution is straightforward:
wi = ci + ε wj = cj,
wi






j ∈ (cj,q j − w
j
i].
for i,j =1 ,2, i 6= j.
Notice that for joint production to be the unique equilibrium, it is necessary to add a negligible
positive quantity ε → 0 to one of the agents’ equilibrium rewards. As it happened with individual
production, in an equilibrium with joint production agents are exactly compensated for their cost of
eﬀort.10 Rewards oﬀered oﬀ the equilibrium of the subgame are such that agents do not deviate from
10We assume ε to be small enough such that proﬁts and conditions for joint production to be optimal are not aﬀected.
7the unique level of production the Principal ﬁnds optimal to implement.11 The Principal’s proﬁts in
the unique equilibrium of the subgame are equal to 1 − c1 − c2.
3.3 Optimal production level with standard agents
Given that in equilibrium agents are paid a reward exactly equal to their cost of eﬀort when they
work, the Principal decides the optimal production level by comparing its proﬁts when joint production
is implemented (1 − c1 − c2)w i t hi t sp r o ﬁts with individual production by the agent with highest
productivity net of his cost (qi − ci for qi − ci ≥ qj − cj for i,j =1 ,2,i6= j). The conditions for each
level of production to be optimal are:
- Individual Production by agent 1 if and only if q1 − c1 ≥ q2 − c2 and q1 ≥ 1 − c2,
- Individual Production by agent 2 if and only if q1 − c1 <q 2 − c2 and q2 ≥ 1 − c1,
-Joint Production if and only if q1 < 1 − c2 and q2 < 1 − c1.
Figure 1 draws these conditions.
Figure 1: Optimal production level with standard agents.
4 Optimal contract with inequity averse agents
In this section we derive the optimal contracts when agents are inequity averse. We follow F&S’s
(1999) model of inequity aversion by adapting their utility function to our context with two agents.
Inequity averse agents’ utility function in our context is UFS
i where:
UFS
i = Ui − αmax[Uj − Ui,0] − β max[Ui − Uj,0] for i,j =1 ,2,i 6= j.
11Notice that the ”most natural” contract, oﬀering no reward to an agent who does not work, does not implement a
unique equilibrium in the subgame.
8where, as before, Ui is each agents’ “direct utility” and is equal to rewards oﬀered minus the cost
of eﬀort performed.12
Assume the following:
(U1) Agents dislike inequity:
α ≥ 0,
β ≥ 0.
(U2) Agents care more for their own direct utility than for inequity:




Assumption (U1) imposes inequity aversion. Agents derive disutility from direct utilities being
unequal. In the following, α refers to negative inequity aversion or envy (dislike to being worse oﬀ than
your peers), while β refers to positive inequity aversion or guilt (dislike to being better oﬀ than your
peers).W ea s s u m et h a tb o t ha g e n t sh a v et h es a m eα and the same β for simplicity.13 Assumption
(U2) implies that agents care more for their own direct utilities than for the comparison with other
agents’ direct utilities. F&S allow for α > 1.W ea s s u m eα ≤ 1 to show that even if inequity aversion
is not dominant, its eﬀects on the optimal contract design can still be substantial. Notice that β ≤ 1
2
is also necessary for own direct utility to be dominant. Otherwise, agents would be willing to transfer
rewards to the other agent ex-post. Additionally, F&S impose β ≤ α, which we do not for generality.
Below we show each agents’ utility in the subgame depending on the action taken and the rewards
oﬀered by the Principal to them and to the other agent. Notice than when agents are inequity averse,
agent’s i direct utility is an externality in agent’s j utility.







w–c–ámax[w-c - w+c,0 ]-âmax[w-c-w+c,0],
































w–c–ámax[w-c - w+c,0 ]-âmax[w-c-w+c,0],

























12While F&S’s original formulation refers to agents comparing ”payoﬀs”, other authors using their preferences in our
context assume that only wages enter into welfare comparisons but not the costs of eﬀort (Grund and Sliwka (2002), Itoh
(2004)). Our results hold with this alternative speciﬁcation although contract design is diﬀerent and more interesting
issues appear when costs of eﬀort enter the comparison. Ultimately, this is an empirical question that may be context
dependent. A ﬁrst experimental study of this issue is Königstein (2000) who conﬁrms that welfare comparisons are
context dependent.
13We focus on asymmetries in productivity parameters instead than on social preferences because they should be
more easily observable and measurable.
9In the following subsections we study how the Principal can employ this externality to its ad-
vantage. We proceed as before, ﬁrst solving the optimal contract for each production level and then
discussing the conditions for each production level to be optimal.
4.1 Optimal contract to implement individual production with inequity
averse agents
As in the previous section, we derive the optimal contract which implements individual production
by agent i when both agents are inequity averse. Deﬁne (ICCind
i ) as agent’s i incentive compatibility
constraint for individual production by agent i to be an equilibrium of the subgame (not necessarily
unique) and (ICCindU
i ) as the necessary constraints for the equilibrium to be unique. The problem
is the following:
-The Principal maximizes its proﬁt:
Max qi − wi
i
subject to:
-Assumptions (C), (R1), (R2), (U1) and (U2).
-( ICCind
i ): wi
i − ci − αmax[wi
j − wi
i + ci,0] − β max[wi





i − ci − wi
j,0] − β max[wi
j − wi
i + ci,0] >
wj − cj − αmax[wi − ci − wj + cj,0] − β max[wj − cj − wi + ci,0].
For the subgame to be dominance solvable, the following constraints are also necessary:
-( ICCindU





j − cj − w
j












j + cj,0] − β max[w
j
j − cj − w
j
i,0] > 0.
We solve this problem in the following two Propositions.
Proposition 1 To implement individual production when agents are inequity averse rewards paid in
the equilibrium of the subgame are the same as with standard agents (wi
i = ci and wi
j =0 ).
Intuitively, the agent who individually works in the equilibrium of the subgame must prefer to
work than not work, given that the other agent is not working. Due to budget constraints (R2), agents
are not paid when they both not work and thus, the utility of both agents when they both do not work
is the same and equal to zero. Inequity generates disutility and because there is no inequity when both
agents do not work, it is optimal not to create inequity when only one agent works (wi
i − ci = wi
j).
Given that rewards cannot be negative, (Assumption (R1)), the minimum rewards needed to be paid
such that agent 1 prefers to individually work than not to work are wi
i = ci and wi
j =0and there
is no inequity in equilibrium. Notice that we must still check that (ICCind
j )h o l d s .W ed os oi nt h e
following Proposition.
10Proposition 2 For individual production by the inequity averse agent i to be the unique equilibrium
of the subgame, oﬀ-equilibrium rewards oﬀered are deﬁned by the following constraints:
a) If w
j














j) and wj − cj <
β
1−β(ci − wi),
a2)I fwj − cj <w i − ci then: wi − ci > 1
1−β[(1 + α)w
j
i − β(wj − cj) − α(w
j
j − cj)] and












j − cj),w j − cj < α
1+α(wi − ci) and
w
j




Proofs are in the Appendix. The main result of this subsection is that optimal rewards paid in
equilibrium are equal to the ones paid with standard agents and thus, the Principal cannot use the
externalities caused by inequity aversion to implement individual production in equilibrium under a
lower total reward cost than with standard agents (Proposition 1). The additional restrictions in
Proposition 2 are needed to ensure that the optimal contract implements a unique equilibrium in the
subgame played by the agents. In the following subsection, we check how the Principal can exploit
inequity aversion to its advantage to implement joint production.
4.2 Optimal contract to implement joint production with inequity averse
agents
Deﬁne (ICCJP
i ) as agent’s i incentive compatibility constraint for joint production to be an equi-
librium of the subgame (not necessarily unique) and (ICCJPU
i ) as the necessary constraints for the
equilibrium of the subgame to be unique. The problem is the following:
-The Principal maximizes its proﬁt:
Max 1 − wi − wj
subject to:
-Assumptions (C), (R1), (R2), (U1) and (U2).
-( ICCJP
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i − ci − αmax[wi
j − wi
i + ci,0] − β max[wi









j + cj,0] − β max[w
j





i − ci − αmax[wi
j − wi
i + ci,0] − β max[wi









j + cj,0] − β max[w
j
j − cj − w
j
i,0] > 0.
11We solve this problem in the following two Propositions. First we ﬁnd the optimal
rewards oﬀered oﬀ the equilibrium of the subgame. The idea is to design these oﬀ equilibrium rewards
such that they create the maximum possible inequities between agents’ utilities. By maximizing
inequity oﬀ equilibrium, agents’ (ICCJP
i )s can hold with minimum rewards paid in equilibrium.
Proposition 3 To implement joint production when agents are inequity averse it is optimal to oﬀer
zero rewards to the agent who does not work while the other agent individually works (w
j
i =0 ).
The intuition behind this result is that if the Principal implements joint production, in equilibrium,
conditional on the other agent working, both agents must prefer to work than not to work. Therefore,
the Principal designs the rewards such that both agents obtain the highest possible disutility when
they shirk, given that the other agent works. Due to limited liability constraints (R1) rewards oﬀered
cannot be negative, and due to (U2) agents care more for their direct utility than for the comparison
with the other agent, thus the disutility of an agent shirking is maximized when he is oﬀered no
reward.
We now look at the reward oﬀered to the agent who individually works oﬀ the equilibrium of the
subgame. The following Proposition states a general result for joint production to be an equilibrium.
We thus focus on conditions (ICCJP
i ). We discuss uniqueness conditions below.
Proposition 4 To implement joint production when agents are inequity averse it is optimal to oﬀer
extreme rewards to the agent who works oﬀ the equilibrium of the subgame (agent i). If the potential
eﬀect of envy on the shirking agent (j) is relatively high (α(qi −ci) ≥ βci), agent i must be oﬀered all
t h eo u t p u th ei n d i v i d u a l l yp r o d u c e s( wi
i = qi). If, in contrast, the potential eﬀect of guilt is relatively
high (α(qi −ci) < βci), agent i must be oﬀered no reward oﬀ the equilibrium of the subgame (wi
i =0 ).
Intuitively, extreme rewards are used to maximize the disutility from inequity aversion oﬀ the
equilibrium of the subgame. The reward oﬀered to the agent who individually works oﬀ-equilibrium
(i) appears in the other agent’s (j) condition for joint production to be an equilibrium (ICCJP
j ).
Thus, the Principal chooses this reward such that it maximizes the disutility of agent j when he does
not work and agent i works. Agent j derives disutility from both envy and guilt, but not from both
at the same time. If, given productivity parameters, the potential to exploit agent’s j envy is higher
than the potential to exploit agent’s j guilt, (α(qi − ci) ≥ βci), then the reward oﬀered must be the
one that maximizes envy.T od os o ,t h ep r i n c i p a lo ﬀers all available production (qi) to agent i when
he individually works. Thus, the envious agent j minimizes his utility when he does not work and
agent i works because not only he does not get any reward, but experiences envy as agent i is paid
the maximum available reward.
If, on the contrary, the potential to exploit agent’s j guilt is higher than the potential to exploit
agent’s j envy (α(qi − ci) < βci), then agent i is oﬀered no reward when he individually works. By
doing so, agent’s j utility is minimized when he does not work because he is not only paid a reward
equal to zero but he also experiences guilt because agent i is performing a costly eﬀort and is paid
the lowest possible reward, which given (R1) it is zero. Notice that without budget constraints and
limited liability, the potential to maximize the eﬀects of envy and guilt would be unlimited. The
12Principal could threat and agent who does not work with oﬀering the other agent an inﬁnite reward
when the other agent individually works (to maximize envy)o ro ﬀer an inﬁnite monetary punishment
(to maximize guilt). We assume (R1) and (R2) to restrict attention to limited and credible threats of
inequity.
In the conditions that determine whether envy or guilt have more potential to harm the shirking
agent, not only do the inequity aversion parameters (α and β) enter, but also the costs of eﬀort
relatively to productivity. Thus, it is easy to reinterpret these conditions in terms of the costs of
eﬀort. Intuitively, if the cost of eﬀort of the agent individually working oﬀ the equilibrium is low
(ci −→ 0), the potential to harm the shirking agent due to guilt is low. Agent j does not feel very
guilty for leaving agent i to work individually because working is not very costly for agent i.B u t ,
in contrast, agent j would feel very envious if agent i is oﬀered a high reward when he individually
works, as the net eﬀect after subtracting the low cost of eﬀort would be high. By rewarding individual
work as high as possible (limited by the amount of total output produced) the Principal maximizes
envy. In contrast, if the cost of eﬀort is high (ci −→ qi), the potential for the Principal to exploit guilt
by oﬀering no reward to the agent who individually works is high, and thus it is optimal to oﬀer no
reward at all to the agent who works oﬀ the equilibrium path.
We ﬁnally look at the equilibrium rewards paid when joint production is implemented. The
following two Propositions are the main result of this paper and show optimal rewards for all output
levels when joint production is implemented as the unique equilibrium of the subgame.
Proposition 5 To implement joint production when agents are inequity averse it is optimal to pay
the following rewards in equilibrium:
-I fα(qi − ci) ≥ βci and α(qj − cj) ≥ βcj:
For qj−cj ≥ qi−ci then: wi = ci−
α(β−1)(qj−cj)−α2(qi−ci)
β−1−α and wj = cj−
αβ(qj−cj)−α(1+α)(qi−ci)
β−1−α .
-I fα(qi − ci) < βci and α(qj − cj) ≥ βcj:
For α(qj − cj) ≥ βci then: wi = ci −
αβci+α(1−β)(qj−cj)
1+α−β and wj = cj −
β(1+α)ci−αβ(qj−cj)
1+α−β .
For α(qj − cj) < βci then: wi = ci −
α(1+α)(qj−cj)−β2ci
1+α−β and wj = cj −
β(1−β)ci+α2(qj−cj)
1+α−β .
Rewards paid in equilibrium are the result of solving the Principal’s problem depending on whether
it is optimal to maximize each agent’s envy or guilt oﬀ the equilibrium of the subgame. From Propo-
sition 4, this is determined by whether α(qi − ci)   βci. Proposition 5 covers three cases, ﬁrst when
it is optimal to exploit both agents’ envy oﬀ-equilibrium (wi
i = qi) and second when it is optimal to
exploit one agent’s envy and the other agent’s guilt (wi
i = qi and w
j
j =0 ).14 In equilibrium both
agents’ (ICCJP)s are satisﬁed with equality. Given the slopes of the indiﬀerence curves deﬁned by
(U1) and (U2), the Principal maximizes proﬁts at the point where both agents’ indiﬀerence curves
intersect each other. Notice that whether this point is on either side of the 45o degree line depends on
which agent suﬀers more from inequity aversion when the other agent individually works. In general,
the agent who suﬀers more from inequity aversion oﬀ-equilibrium is the agent who obtains less direct
utility in equilibrium. The following three graphs show the solution of the Principal’s problem for the
three possible sub-cases.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium rewards when agent i experiences guilt and agent j is envious when the other
agent works.
We have left out one possible case. When α(qi − ci) < βci,t h ep o t e n t i a le ﬀect of guilt dominates
the potential eﬀect of envy for both agents. Thus, it would be optimal to oﬀer both agents a reward
equal to zero when they individually work (wi
i =0 ). However, notice that this would imply that both
agents would prefer not to work when the other agent is also not working, turning no production into
an equilibrium of the subgame. As we are interested in uniqueness of the equilibrium of the subgame,
such that the contract oﬀered by the Principal implements the optimal level of production, one of
the rewards oﬀered to an individually working agent has to be changed. As Proposition 6s t a t e s ,
under these circumstances it is optimal to continue oﬀering no reward to one of the agents when he
individually works (wi
i =0 ) while it is optimal to oﬀer all the available production to the other agent
when he individually works (w
j
j = cj).15 Thus, oﬀ equilibrium, one agent will feel envious while the
other feels guilty. Proposition 6 shows which agent is optimally oﬀered a reward equal to the available
production oﬀ-equilibrium and the rewards paid in equilibrium.
Proposition 6 To implement joint production when agents are inequity averse and guilt dominates
for both agents, the optimal rewards are as follows:
For α(qi − ci) < βci , α(qj − cj) < βcj and cj ≥ ci then:
If α(qj − cj) ≥ βci
if (1 − 2β)[α(qj − cj) − βcj] ≥ (1 + 2α)[α(qi − ci) − βci],
15Notice that when maximum guilt cannot be generated due to the equilibrium not being unique, it is optimal to go
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j = qj,w i = ci −
α(1+α)(qj−cj)−β2ci
1+α−β and wj = cj −
β(1−β)ci+α2(qj−cj)
1+α−β ,




j =0 ,w i = ci −
β(1−β)cj+α2(qi−ci)
1+α−β and wj = cj −
α(1+α)(qi−ci)−β2cj
1+α−β .
T h ec h o i c eo fw h i c ha g e n tt oo ﬀer all the available output when he individually works depends
on the diﬀerence between the maximum possible eﬀect of exploiting each agent’s envy and guilt.I n
particular, it is crucial whether α(qj −cj)   βci. The Principal, in order to maximize proﬁts, chooses
the oﬀ equilibrium rewards such that the sum of the rewards paid in equilibrium is the lowest possible.
In the two ﬁgures below we draw the two points at which the Principal could be maximizing proﬁts.
In Figure 6, both points are on the same side of the 45‘ degree line, meaning that no matter if agent i’s
envy or guilt is exploited oﬀ equilibrium, agent j obtains more direct utility in the unique equilibrium
of the subgame than agent i. Figure 7, draws the case where depending on which agents’ envy or guilt
































1 j j i c q c
Agent’s i indifference curve








































1 j j i c q c
Agent’s i indifference curve








1 j j i c q c































1 i i j c q c
Agent’s i indifference curve









































1 i i j c q c
Agent’s i indifference curve










j i i c c q
Figure 7: Equilibrium rewards depending on whether wi − ci   wj − cj.
Finally. given the results of Propositions 5 and 6 we can conclude the following:
Corollary 7 The cost of implementing joint production is lower with inequity averse agents than with
standard ones.
Intuitively, the Principal could always implement an equilibrium in which both agents work by
exactly compensating them for their cost of eﬀort when they work, and oﬀering them no reward when
they do not work. The reason is that in equilibrium, when both agents are exactly compensated
by their costs of eﬀort, there is no inequity and thus, transformed utilities are the same as direct
utilities. However, the Principal can do better than exactly compensate the costs of eﬀort, and thus,
pay lower rewards. Following Propositions 3 to 6, the Principal can create inequity oﬀ the equilibrium
of the subgame such that inequity averse agents’ utilities are lower than standard agents’ direct
utilities. Thus, paying agents a reward smaller than their cost of eﬀort but maintaining more equity
in equilibrium than oﬀ-equilibrium, joint production is optimally implemented at a lower total cost
f o rt h eP r i n c i p a lt h a nw i t hs t a n d a r dp r e f e r e n c e s .
Notice that this does not mean that equity is maximized when joint production is implemented
nor that rewards paid in equilibrium are the same for both agents. Rewards paid just need to be
suﬃciently close for both (ICCJP
i )s to hold at the lowest reward cost in equilibrium for the Principal.
Once we have studied optimal rewards, we need to look at possible changes in the conditions for
optimal implementation of individual or joint production.
174.3 Optimal production level with inequity averse agents
Once we have shown the optimal rewards needed to be paid in equilibrium to implement each produc-
tion level, we look at the conditions for each output level to be optimal. Notice that from previous
results it is obvious that whenever the conditions for joint production to be optimal with standard
agents are satisﬁed (qi < 1 −cj for i,j =1 ,2,i6= j ) it is still optimal to implement joint production
when agents are inequity averse. The reason is that while the total reward cost needed to be spent in
equilibrium to implement individual production is the same with standard an inequity averse agents,
from Corollary 7 the total reward cost needed to implement joint production is lower with inequity
averse agents. Thus, it is possible that under same values for the productivity parameters, it may
be optimal to implement individual production by standard agents while it is optimal to implement
joint production with inequity averse agents. Obviously, changes of equilibrium implemented from
individual production by one agent to individual production by the other agent are not possible.
We now show the conditions for the Principal to ﬁnd optimal to implement joint production under
the three possible sets of equilibrium rewards paid when agents are inequity averse:
-I fwi = ci −
α(β−1)(qj−cj)−α2(qi−ci)
β−1−α and wj = cj −
αβ(qj−cj)−α(1+α)(qi−ci)
β−1−α then joint production
is optimal when qi > 1 − cj +
α(1−2β)(qj−cj)+α(1+2α)(qi−ci)
β−1−α .
-I fwi = ci −
αβci+α(1−β)(qj−cj)
1+α−β and wj = cj −
β(1+α)ci−αβ(qj−cj)
1+α−β then joint production is optimal
when qi > 1 − cj −
(1+2α)βci+α(1−2β)(qj−cj)
β−1−α .
-I fwi = ci −
α(1+α)(qj−cj)−β2ci
1+α−β and wj = cj −
β(1−β)ci+α2(qj−cj)
1+α−β then joint production is optimal
when qi > 1 − cj −
α(1+2α)(qi−ci)+β(1−2β)cj
β−1−α .
Otherwise, the Principal implements individual production by the agent for which qi−ci is highest.
Appendix A contains a numerical example showing how the optimal contract changes when, under
same productivity parameters, it is optimal to implement individual production with standard agents
and joint production with inequity averse agents. Appendix B contains a second example which shows
that even if the optimal production level does not change, the loss in proﬁts the Principal incurs when
he does not take into account inequity aversion is far from negligible. This example is symmetric as we
assume q1 = q2 =0 .5 and c1 = c2 =0 .4. Under those parameter values it is optimal to implement joint
production when agents are standard and thus, it will still be optimal to implement joint production
when agents are inequity averse. The loss for the Principal is deﬁned as the diﬀerence in his proﬁts
(production minus rewards paid) between oﬀering an inequity averse contract and a standard contract
to inequity averse agents as a proportion of the total output implemented in joint production (equal
to 1). This loss is an increasing function in the envy (α)a n dguilt (β) parameters. The Principal’s
loss can be up to 40% of the total output produced.
In summary, in our simple model without uncertainty, accounting for inequity aversion has no
extra cost for the Principal in equilibrium, and the Principal can beneﬁt from it to implement joint
production under a lower total reward cost, thus obtaining higher proﬁts. Inequity aversion might
also change the optimal production level. In the next section we comment on the robustness of our
r e s u l t st oo t h e rt y p e so fd i s tributional preferences.
185S t a t u s a n d E ﬃciency seeking Preferences
It can be argued that in some contexts, other types of distributional preferences might be more
relevant than inequity aversion. In particular, in very competitive ﬁrms, agents might not be averse
to inequity but instead they might enjoy it, as long as it is the other agent who is worse oﬀ than them.
Such agents will not feel guilt but spite when being better oﬀ than their peers, while they will still
feel envious when being worse oﬀ. We call these agents ”Status Seeking”, interpreting having higher
status as being higher in the ranking of agents’ welfare, i.e., as being better oﬀ than other agents.
In other contexts in which each agent contributes a lot to total production, agents might feel
disutility when shrinking because the total amount of output, and thus, the total amount of rewards
available to be distributed among agents, gets smaller when they shirk. We call these agents ”Eﬃciency
Seeking”, interpreting eﬃciency as the sum of agents’ welfare net of the costs of eﬀort.
These distributional concerns have been captured by other forms of utility functions.16 However,
it is worth noticing that by simply changing the range of values parameters α and β in the F&S
utility function can take, it is possible to look at the array of possible purely distributional concerns
in a uniﬁed model. We now use this re-parametrization of the model to explore the consequences in
optimal contract design. Notice that the problems we solve are the same as in Section 4, although
solutions change when we allow for diﬀerent parameter values.
5.1 Reward Design with Status Seeking Preferences
Assume now that α ∈ [0,1), β < 0 and |β| ≤ 1. This means that agents are still averse to disadvanta-
geous inequity but like advantageous inequity. The following two Propositions cover the key issues of
contract design when agents are status seeking.
Proposition 8 To implement individual production when agents are status seeking, rewards paid in
the equilibrium of the subgame are the same as with standard agents (wi
i = ci and wi
j =0 ).
As it happened with inequity averse agents, the optimal contract to implement individual produc-
tion implies paying the agent who individually works (i) a reward exactly equal to his cost of eﬀort
(ci) and paying no reward to the shirking agent. The reason is that in the right hand side (RHS) of
(ICCind
i ) there is no production and thus, both agents are paid zero and no agent is ahead. One could
argue that since agent i likes being better oﬀ than his peer, it would be easier to provide incentives
to agent i to work by making him better oﬀ than agent j when agent i individually works. However,
given that it is still optimal to pay no reward to agent j when he does not work (due to (R1) the
Principal cannot pay him less), the only way to use that agent i is status seeking is by making him
better oﬀ than agent j. But this would imply paying agent i above his cost of eﬀort, which cannot be
optimal. Thus, as it happened with inequity averse agents, status seeking preferences cannot be used
to implement individual production with lower rewards than with standard preferences.
16See Charness and Rabin (2002) for a summary.
19Proposition 9 To implement joint production when agents are status seeking the optimal contract is
as follows:
wi = ci −
α(β − 1)(qj − cj) − α2(qi − ci)
β − 1 − α
wj = cj −
αβ(qj − cj) − α(1 + α)(qi − ci)
β − 1 − α
,
wi







for α(qi − ci) ≥ βci and i,j =1 ,2,i6= j.
Notice that to implement joint production, the only way to create inequity oﬀ the equilibrium of
the subgame is by generating disutility via envy on the agent who shirks, and thus it is optimal to
oﬀer no reward to the agent who shirks and all individual output to the agent who individually works.
Therefore, only envy is used in this case. The reason is that spite provides utility to the shirking
agent, making his (ICCJP
i )m o r ed i ﬃcult to hold. Rewards paid in the equilibrium of the subgame
are deﬁned by the ﬁrst expression in Proposition 5 .The graphic representation is the same as Figure
5. Notice that rewards paid are not necessarily equal when productivities are asymmetric and thus,
in equilibrium still one agent could be better oﬀ than the other, although with a smaller diﬀerence
than oﬀ the equilibrium of the subgame. Now things are even better for the Principal. As agents like
to be better oﬀ than each other, the Principal needs to pay even less in equilibrium to the agent who
is best oﬀ. As agents’ (ICCJP
i )s bind, the agent who suﬀers more from envy oﬀ-equilibrium is the
one who will optimally be better oﬀ in the equilibrium, i.e., if qi − ci ≥ qj − cj then it is optimal to
choose wi and wj such that wj − cj ≥ wi − ci.
Following results in section 4.3, the Principal ﬁnds optimal to implement joint production when
qi > 1 − cj +
α(1−2β)(qj−cj)+α(1+2α)(qi−ci)
β−1−α for i,j =1 ,2,i6= j. Otherwise, the Principal implements
individual production by the agent for which qi − ci is highest.
5.2 Reward Design with Eﬃciency Seeking Preferences
Assume now that α < 0, β ∈ [0,1/2), and |α| ≤ |β|. This implies that agents always prefer higher
rewards for themselves and the other agent, but are more in favor of getting higher rewards for
themselves when they are worse oﬀ than the other agent than when they are better oﬀ.A g e n t s ’
concern for eﬃciency means that they care the total amount of rewards oﬀered by the Principal. They
always prefer a higher total amount of rewards, no matter if the extra rewards are all oﬀered to the
other agent. This leaves the possibility for the Principal to exploit eﬃciency seeking preferences.17
The following two Propositions cover the key issues of contract design when agents are eﬃciency
seeking.
Proposition 10 To optimally implement individual production when agents are eﬃciency seeking, the
sum of rewards paid in the equilibrium of the subgame is the same as with standard agents (wi
i+wi
j = ci)
17We deﬁne eﬃciency from the point of view of the agents, i.e., as the sum of agents’ direct utilities.
20Intuitively, the agent who individually works in equilibrium (agent i)m u s tp r e f e rt ow o r kt h a nn o t
to work given that agent j does not work. When both agents do not work rewards are zero and thus,
agent i should obtain positive utility when working for his (ICCind
i ) to hold. However, the only way
to use that agent i is eﬃciency concerned to implement an equilibrium in which he individually works
and paying a lower reward than his cost of eﬀort is by oﬀering ”more eﬃcient rewards”. i.e., a total
sum of rewards that adds to more agent’s i cost of eﬀort. This is a contradiction. Thus, individual
production cannot be implemented with a total sum of rewards paid in equilibrium lower than the
cost of eﬀort of the agent who individually works. Notice that equilibrium rewards are not necessarily
equal to the cost of eﬀort of the agent who individually works, although the sum of rewards paid must
be equal to it.
Proposition 11 To implement joint production when agents are eﬃciency seeking the optimal con-
t r a c ti sa sf o l l o w s :
















for ci >c j.
Notice that, contrary to previous sections, now extreme rewards (all production or no production
at all) are not oﬀered to all agents oﬀ the equilibrium of the subgame. In particular, agent j receives an
oﬀer equal to his cost of eﬀort when he individually works (w
j
j = cj,). The reason is that oﬀering the
most ineﬃcient rewards oﬀ equilibrium, i.e., no reward to all agents oﬀ equilibrium, the equilibrium






j =0 , then no production is
clearly an equilibrium of the subgame, as agents obtain the same rewards when they both do not work
than when they individually work and, as no agent performs eﬀort, there is more eﬃciency when they
both do not work. To obtain uniqueness, it is necessary to oﬀer a reward that compensates one agent
for his cost of eﬀort, in order for him to prefer to individually work than not to work, given that the
other agent is not working. The choice of which agent is oﬀered a reward equal to his eﬀort cost when
individually working is determined by agents’ costs of eﬀort. Notice that Proposition 11 says that
the agent who has a smaller cost of eﬀort (agent j) is the one that must be oﬀered a reward equal
to his cost of eﬀort. The reason is that, by oﬀering a reward equal to zero to the agent with highest
cost (wi
i =0 ), the Principal creates more ineﬃciency oﬀ equilibrium and thus, he can implement joint
production as the unique equilibrium of the subgame with the lowest possible total sum of rewards
paid. Also notice that the agent with the highest cost is paid in equilibrium a reward higher than
his cost of eﬀort (wi = ci +
β2
1+α−βci >c i as β < 1
2,
¯ ¯α < 1
2
¯ ¯), while the other agent is paid a reward
suﬃciently lower than his cost of eﬀort (wj = cj +
β(β−1)
1+α−βci <c j ), such that the total sum of rewards
paid in equilibrium is lower than the sum of both agents’ cost of eﬀort.
Finally, it is optimal to implement joint production when agents are eﬃciency concerned whenever
1 − cj +
2β(β−1)
1+α−β ci >q i and 1 − ci +
2β(β−1)
1+α−β ci >q j for ci >c j. If these conditions are not satisﬁed,
the Principal implements individual production by the agent for which qi − ci is highest.
216 Discussion
We have shown how distributional preferences change optimal contracts in a simple Principal-Agent
setting where agents have already entered the ﬁrm. Optimal rewards paid to implement joint produc-
tion are lower than with standard agents and the optimal level of production can change. Finally, we
have shown that accounting for distributional preferences is beneﬁcial for the Principal and has no
drawbacks.
Despite its simplicity, our model provides a new rationale for team and relative performance
contracts in contexts with no informational asymmetries. In both these types of contracts, agents are
threaten with welfare inequities when some employees work harder than others. In team contracts, if
a member of the team shirks, the team’s performance is going to be less successful and thus, other
members of the team who have worked hard will not see their eﬀorts rewarded, for which the shrinking
agent might feel guilty. Therefore, agents might decide not to shirk even if rewards are low, to avoid
feeling guilty for the members of the tam who work hard. In a relative performance contract, an agent
who does not work hard will be ranked low, and thus, will be worse oﬀ than higher ranked agents,
for which he may actually feel envious. Thus in competitive contexts it may not be necessary to oﬀer
such high rewards if agents are envious of each other and compete not to be ranked lower than their
peers. Thus, welfare comparisons among peers can be used by the employer to provide incentives to
work hard. We just show, depending on how employees compare to their peers, when it is optimal to
use each type of contract.
Our model highlights how Behavioral Contract Theory could be useful to study issues of organiza-
tion in the ﬁrm. Both the Human Resources Literature and the Personnel Economics Literature have
studied these issues before.18 The contribution of our paper is that it highlights that comparisons
among agents are important and can be aﬀected by the design of the contract. Our model suggests
that optimal contracts depend on the strength of welfare comparisons. If that is the case, it may
be possible to aﬀect the strength of those comparisons in the workplace. We have here assumed
everything was common knowledge. However, in real ﬁrms the employer might be able to inﬂuence
which information is easily available to his employees, once it has been clariﬁed which variables enter
employees welfare comparisons in diﬀerent contexts. In particular, decisions such as whether to make
salaries publicly available to co-workers or not, or the allocation of oﬃce space (which might aﬀect the
observability of eﬀort by co-workers) could be illuminated by issues here discussed. Although in many
ﬁrms rewards are kept secret19 and employees work in separate and closed oﬃc e s ,w eh a v ep r o v i d e d
one of the factors that might aﬀect these decisions.
Finally, notice that by using subgame perfect implementation our results are collusive proof as
the subgame is dominance solvable and thus, the equilibrium is unique. Equilibrium Uniqueness is
important since exploiting distributional preferences to the Principal’s advantage implies that both
agents would be worse oﬀ when they both work than when they do not. Thus, if the equilibrium was
18See Lazear (1995).
19Even if Bewley (1999) reports that 87% of managers interviewed think that their employees know each others’
wages.
22not unique, agents could coordinate on not working to avoid being exploited by the Principal. Notice
also that in our model agents do not have incentives to transfer rewards to the other agent to reduce
inequity, as they care more for own rewards than for equity. Therefore, we have shown, contrary to
the gift-exchange idea discussed in the labor literature, how under some circumstances distributional
preferences may be used proﬁtably to provide incentives for employees to work.
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8A p p e n d i x A
Proof of Proposition 1
Rewards paid in the equilibrium of the subgame (wi
i,wi
j)a p p e a ri n(ICCind
i ) and (ICCind
j ). By
(R2) the value of the Right Hand Side (RHS) of (ICCind
i ) is zero and both agents obtain the same
utility when they both do not work. By (U1) α and β are positive. By choosing wi
i − ci = wi
j,t h e
terms that compare direct utilities in (ICCind
i ) are equal to zero and do not subtract utility in the Left
Hand Side (LHS) of the condition. The Principal’s objective is to Maximize qi − wi
i, thus Minimize
wi
i. By setting wi
i = ci and wi
j =0the Principal maximizes proﬁts with (ICCind
i ) holding. Although
the optimal value of wi and wj is determined in Proposition 2 below, notice that when wi
i = ci and
wi
j =0 , condition (ICCind
j )h o l d sm o r ee a s i l y .Proposition 2 shows the optimal values of wi and wj
in order for (ICCind
j ) to hold, and thus for individual production to be an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2
The restrictions are the result of rearranging conditions (ICCind
j ), (ICCindU
i )a n d( ICCindU
j )
and simplifying the terms that compare direct utilities. There are four cases depending on whether









j − cj violates (ICCind
j )i f( ICCindU
i )a n d( ICCindU
j ) hold and thus, this case is removed.
Proof of Proposition 3
The Principal decides the optimal w
j
i to minimize agent’s i utility when he does not work, given





















24Notice that inequity aversion imposes that an agent obtains disutility either from being better oﬀ
or worse oﬀ than the other agent, but not from both at the same time.





Thus, to minimize the utility of agent i when not working, w
j
i =0 , as the derivative
of agent’s i utility with respect to the reward oﬀered to agent j equals 1+α > 0 by
assumption (U1).




j +cj ≥ 0.
Thus, to minimize the utility of agent i when he does not work, w
j
i =0 ,a st h ed e r i v a t i v e
of agent’s i utility with respect to the reward oﬀered to agent j equals 1 − β > 0,b y
assumption (U2).
Proof of Proposition 4
Assume agent i individually works oﬀ the equilibrium of the subgame.
The reward oﬀered to agent i when he individually works (wi
i) only appears in agent j’s no deviation
condition (ICCJP
j ). The Principal seeks to minimize agent j’s utility when he does not work.
By Proposition 1,t h eo p t i m a lr e w a r do ﬀered to agent j when agent i individually works is wi
j =0 .











where by (R1) and (R2),
wi
i ∈ [0,q i],
and by (C),
0 ≤ ci ≤ qi.
Thus, minimizing agent j’s utility implies:
wi
i = qi if α(qi − ci) ≥ βci
and
wi
i =0 if α(qi − ci) < βci.
Proof of Proposition 5
If α(qi − ci) ≥ βci for i =1 ,2,i ti so p t i m a lt oc h o o s ewi
i = qi. Conditions (ICCJPU)s hold using
results in Proposition 3. The Principal maximizes 1 − w1 − w2 subject to both (ICCJP)s. Using the
slopes of the indiﬀerence curves given by (U1) and (U2), the conditions optimally hold with equality
and proﬁts are maximized at the unique point at which indiﬀerence curves intersect.




j = qj. The two cases are created by whether the intersection of both indiﬀerence curves occurs at
ap o i n tw h e r ewi − ci   wj − cj.
25Proof of Proposition 6




j = qj. However the equilibrium of the subgame played by the agents would not be unique.
Inequity has to be maximum oﬀ equilibrium and thus, it is optimal to oﬀer oﬀ equilibrium rewards




j = qj for i,j =1 ,2,i6= j. Therefore, one of the indiﬀerence curve of the agents’ is not satisﬁed with
equality. The optimal rewards are obtained at the intersection of the indiﬀerence curve which holds
with equality and the parallel indiﬀerence curve that does not hold with equality (The discontinued
lines in Figure 6 and 7). The conditions indicate for which of the four possible cases, proﬁts are
maximized.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y7
From Propositions 5 and 6, there are three possible cases:
-I fwi = ci −
α(β−1)(qj−cj)−α2(qi−ci)
β−1−α and wj = cj −
αβ(qj−cj)−α(1+α)(qi−ci)
β−1−α then
wi + wj = ci + cj −
α(1−2β)(qj−cj)+α(1+2α)(qi−ci)
β−1−α <c i + cj by (C), (U1) and (U2).
-I fwi = ci −
αβci+α(1−β)(qj−cj)
1+α−β and wj = cj −
β(1+α)ci−αβ(qj−cj)
1+α−β then
wi + wj = ci + cj +
(1+2α)βci+α(1−2β)(qj−cj)
β−1−α <c i + cj by (C), (U1) and (U2).
-I fwi = ci −
α(1+α)(qj−cj)−β2ci
1+α−β and wj = cj −
β(1−β)ci+α2(qj−cj)
1+α−β then
wi + wj = ci + cj +
α(1+2α)(qi−ci)+β(1−2β)cj
β−1−α <c i + cj by (C), (U1) and (U2).
Proof of Proposition 8
Rewards paid in the equilibrium of the subgame (wi
i,w
j
j)a p p e a ri n(ICCind
i ) and (ICCind
j ). By
(R2) the value of the Right Hand Side (RHS) of (ICCind
i ) is zero and both agents obtain the same
utility when they both do not work. As α > 0, the only possible way to make condition (ICCind
i )
hold under a lower total reward cost is by setting wi
i − ci ≥ wi
j. However, by (R1) wi
j ≥ 0, and thus,
wi
i ≥ ci. The minimum reward needed to be paid in equilibrium are thus wi
i = ci and wi
j =0 .
Proof of Proposition 9
As β < 0, agents only obtain disutility from envy. To maximize the eﬀect of envy oﬀ the joint
production equilibrium, the agent who does not work oﬀ equilibrium is oﬀered no reward (w
j
i =0for
i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j) and the agent who works is oﬀered all available production (wi
i = qi for i =1 ,2).
The expression for the equilibrium rewards paid follows calculations in Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 10
Assume agent i individually works oﬀ the equilibrium of the subgame. For (ICCind
i )t oh o l d ,
agent i must obtain positive utility when he works given that agent j does not work. However, given
that α < 0, the only possible way to implement individual production by agent i with wi
i <c i is by
paying agent j a reward that gives him more direct utility than agent i, i.e., wi
j − wi
i − ci > 0. Thus,
wi
j >w i
i + ci ,w h i c h ,g i v e n( R 1 ) ,i m p l i e swi
i + wi
j ≥ ci The minimum sum of rewards thus needed to
be paid to implement individual production by agent i is wi
i + wi
j = ci.
26Proof of Proposition 11
To maximize the eﬀect of ineﬃciency oﬀ equilibrium, all agents should be oﬀered no reward oﬀ
equilibrium, no matter if they work or they do not. However, by doing so, no production would be
an equilibrium as (ICCJPU
i )f o ri =1 ,2 would not hold. Thus, it is necessary that one agent prefers
to individually work than not to work, given that the other agent does not work. Assume agent i is
the agent who prefers to work than not to work. For (ICCJPU
i )t oh o l dw i t ht h em a x i m u mp o s s i b l e
ineﬃciency when agent i individually works, it is optimal to set wi
i = ci and wi
j =0 . When agent j




j =0 . The remaining two
equilibrium rewards are obtained at the intersection between both (ICCJP
i )f o ri =1 ,2:
wi − ci − β(wi − ci − wj + cj) ≥ 0
wj − cj − α(wi − ci − wj + cj) ≥− βci,
which yields: wi = ci +
β2
1+α−βci and wj = cj +
β(β−1)
1+α−βci.
Notice that the sum of rewards paid in equilibrium equals wi+wj = ci+cj +
2β(β−1)
1+α−β ci. As α < 0,
β ∈ [0,1/2), and |α| ≤ |β| then
2β(β−1)
1+α−β < 0 and thus, it is optimal to set wi
i = ci for the agent for
which the cost of eﬀort is highest, i.e., for ci >c j and i,j =1 ,2,i6= j.
9 Appendix B: Numerical examples
9.1 Change of optimal production level
Assume α =0 .9,β =0 .1,q 1 =0 .7,c 1 =0 .5,q 2 =0 .5 and c2 =0 .4.
The conditions for individual production by agent 1 to be optimal, 1 − c2 ≤ q1 if (q1 − c1) >
(q2 − c2), holds as 1 − 0.4 ≤ 0.7 with (0.7 − 0.5) > (0.5 − 0.4). Therefore, in the equilibrium of the
subgame when agents are standard rewards paid are w1
1 =0 .5 and w1
2 =0 , and proﬁts (q1 − w1
1)a r e
equal to 0.2.
Now we look at joint production with inequity averse agents. From Proposition 3, it is optimal to
oﬀer w2
1 = w1
2 =0to the agent who does not work when the other agent individually works. Notice
also that α(qi − ci) > βci for i =1 ,2,a s :
0.9(0.7 − 0.5) > 0.1(0.5)
0.9(0.5 − 0.4) > 0.1(0.4).
Thus, it is optimal to oﬀer all output to the agent who individually works oﬀ equilibrium: w1
1 =
q1 =0 .7 and w2
2 = q2 =0 .5.
Finally, notice that α(q1 −c1) > α(q2 −c2) as 0.18 > 0.09. Thus, in equilibrium w1 −c1 >w 2 −c2
and the (ICCJP
i )s are:
w1 − 0.5 − 0.1(w1 − 0.5 − w2 +0 .4) ≥− 0.09
w2 − 0.4 − 0.9(w1 − 0.5 − w2 +0 .4) ≥− 0.18.
27Solving these two inequalities with equality, we obtain the optimal equilibrium rewards for joint
production, w1 =0 .415 and w2 =0 .265.Thus, proﬁts when joint production is implemented are
equal to 1 − w1 − w2 =0 .32, which are higher than proﬁts with individual production by agent 1
as 0.32 > 0.2. There, joint production is optimal when agents are inequity averse while individual
production by agent 1 is optimal when agents are standard.
9.2 Principal’s loss when joint production is not optimally implemented
Assume q1 = q2 =0 .5 and c1 = c2 =0 .4.
The condition for joint production to be optimal when agents are standard, 1−q1 ≥ c2 if (q1−c1) ≥
(q2 − c2) holds, as 1 − 0.5 ≥ 0.4 with (0.5 − 0.4) ≥ (0.5 − 0.4).
Thus, with standard preferences the total cost of implementing joint production equals the sum of
both agents’ costs of eﬀort: w1 + w2 = c1 + c2 =0 .8.
When agents are inequity averse, the agent who individually works oﬀ equilibrium is oﬀered a
reward equal to total individual production, wi
i = qi if α(qj − cj) ≥ βcj for i,j =1 ,2,i6= j.T h u s ,
there are two cases:
a) If α(0.5 − 0.4) ≥ β(0.4) ⇒ α ≥ 4β then: w1
1 = w2
2 =0 .5,
b) If α(0.5 − 0.4) < β(0.4) ⇒ α < 4β then: w1
1 = w2
2 =0 .
a) Assume α ≥ 4β. The no deviation conditions for each agent to work when the other
agent works are:
w1 − 0.4 − αmax[w2 − 0.4 − w1 +0 .4,0] − β max[w1 − 0.4 − w2 +0 .4,0] ≥− α[0.5 − 0.4],
w2 − 0.4 − αmax[w1 − 0.4 − w2 +0 .4,0] − β max[w2 − 0.4 − w1 +0 .4,0] ≥− α[0.5 − 0.4].
As the productivity parameters are the same for both agents, in equilibrium there is no inequity
and equilibrium rewards are:
w1 = w2 =0 .4 − 0.1α.
b) Assume α < 4β. The no deviation conditions for each agent to work when the other
agent works are:
w1 − 0.4 − αmax[w2 − 0.4 − w1 +0 .4,0] − β max[w1 − 0.4 − w2 +0 .4,0] ≥− β(0.4),
w2 − 0.4 − αmax[w1 − 0.4 − w2 +0 .4,0] − β max[w2 − 0.4 − w1 +0 .4,0] ≥− β(0.4).
As the productivity parameters are the same for both agents, in equilibrium there is no inequity
and equilibrium rewards are:
w1 = w2 =0 .4(1 − β).
We calculate the Principal’s possible loss as the diﬀerence between the Principal’s proﬁts (produc-
tion minus rewards) with and without inequity aversion. As production when both agents work is
normalized to 1, this loss is expressed in terms of the total production exerted.
28Thus, the loss function is
[1 − 2(0.4 − 0.1α)] − [1 − 0.8] when α ≥ 4β,
[1 − 2(0.4)(1 − β)] − [1 − 0.8] when α < 4β.












Figure 8: Principal’s loss when q1 = q2 =0 .5 and c1 = c2 =0 .4.
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